World Inventory Of Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium, 1992

Pt. I. Introduction. 1. Reasons, Aims And Sources. Ii. Four Security Contexts. Iii. The Need For Greater Transparency. Iv. The Limits To Accuracy. V. The Scope Of The Book. 2. Characteristics Of Highly Enriched Uranium And Plutonium And Their Production Processes. Ii. Highly Enriched Uranium. Iii. Plutonium -- Pt. Ii. Military Inventories In The Nuclear Weapon States. 3. Inventories Of Military Plutonium In The Nuclear Weapon States. Ii. The Production Process. Iii. Methods Of Estimating Military Plutonium Inventories. Iv. The United States. V. The Former Soviet Union. Vi. The United Kingdom. Vii. France. Viii. China. 4. Weapon-grade Uranium Inventories In Nuclear Weapon States. Ii. Overview Of Enrichment Programmes. Iii. The United States. Iv. The Former Soviet Union. V. China. Vi. The United Kingdom. Vii. France --^ Pt. Iii. Principal Civil Inventories. 5. Plutonium Produced In Power Reactors. Ii. The Fuel Cycle In Civil Reactor Systems. Iii. Fuelling Strategy And Fuel Burn-up. Iv. A Sketch Of Methods. V. Discharges Of Spent Fuel From Civil Reactors. 6. Reprocessing Programmes And Plutonium Arisings. I. Reprocessing In The Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Ii. The Evolution Of Fuel-cycle Strategies. Iii. A Sketch Of Methods. Iv. Overview Of Power-reactor Fuel Reprocessing. V. Commercial Reprocessing Programmes. Vi. Summary Of Past Power- And Fast-reactor Fuel Reprocessing. Vii. Projections Of Plutonium Separation To 2010. 7. Commercial And Research And Development Uses Of Plutonium. Ii. Fast-reactor Fuel Cycles. Iii. Plutonium Use In Fast Reactors. Iv. Past And Projected Plutonium Consumption In Fast Reactors. V. Plutonium Use In Thermal Reactors. Vi. National Programmes For Thermal Plutonium Recycle. Vii. Summary Of Plutonium Use In Thermal Reactors: Past And Projected. Viii.^ Commercial And R&d Plutonium Use Compared With Quantities Separated. 8. Civil Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories. Ii. Civil Heu Suppliers. Iii. Reactors Using Heu Fuels, 1992. Iv. Converting To Low-enriched Uranium Fuels. V. Reprocessing Of Heu Fuels. Vi. Civil Heu Inventories -- Pt. Iv. Material Inventories And Production Capabilities In The Threshold States. 9. De Facto Nuclear Weapon States: Israel, India And Pakistan. I. Israel. Ii. India. Iii. Pakistan. 10. Countries Of Concern: Iraq, North Korea, Iran And Algeria. I. Iraq. Ii. North Korea. Iii. France. Iv. Algeria. 11. Countries Backing Away From Nuclear Weapons: Argentina, Brazil, South Africa And Taiwan. Ii. Argentina And Brazil. Iii. South Africa. Iv. Taiwan --^ Pt. V. Conclusions. 12. Overview Of Present And Future Stocks Of Plutonium And Highly Enriched Uranium. I. Inventories At The End Of 1990. Ii. Types Of Inventory. Iii. Location Of Inventories By Npt Status. Iv. Material Under International Safeguards. V. Possible Future Trends In Plutonium And Heu Inventories. 13. Two Policy Issues. I. The Need For An International Register Of Plutonium And Heu. Ii. The Management Of Plutonium And Heu Surpluses -- Appendix A. Enrichment Technologies -- Appendix B. Calculation Of Plutonium Production In Power Reactors -- Appendix C. Separation Of Plutonium From Power Reactor Fuel At Reprocessing Plants -- Appendix D. Research Reactors (>1 Mwth) Using Heu Fuel. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, And William Walker. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.