The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence

Klein Takes The Position That The Self Is Not A 'thing' Easily Reduced To An Object Of Scientific Analysis. Rather, The Self Consists Of A Multiplicity Of Aspects, Some Of Which Have A Neuro-cognitive Basis (and Thus Are Amenable To Scientific Inquiry) While Other Aspects Are Best Construed As First-person Subjectivity, Lacking Material Instantiation. As A Consequence Of Their Potential Immateriality, The Subjective Aspect Of Self Cannot Be Taken As An Object And Therefore Is Not Easily Amenable To Treatment By Current Scientific Methods. Introductory Remarks About The Problem Of The Self -- The Epistemological Self : The Self Of Neural Instantiation -- The Ontological Self : The Self Of First-person Subjectivity -- The Epistemological And Ontological Selves : A Brief Summing Up -- Empirical Evidence And The Ontological And Epistemological Selves -- Some Final Thoughts. Stanley B. Klein. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 127-148) And Index.