An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts

In This Revised Second Edition, An Introduction To The Economics Of Information Covers The Consequences For The Character And Efficiency Of The Interaction Between Individuals And Organizations When One Party Has More Or Better Information On Some Aspect Of The Relationship. This Is The Condition Of Asymmetric Information, Under Which The Information Gap Will Be Exploited If, By Doing So, The Better-informed Party Can Achieve Some Advantage. The Book Is Written For A One-semester Course For Advanced Undergraduates Taking Specialized Course Options, And For First-year Postgraduate Students Of Economics Or Business.--jacket. 1. Introduction -- 2. The Base Model -- 3. The Moral Hazard Problem -- 4. The Adverse Selection Problem -- Signalling -- Mathematical Appendix: Concavity And Optimization. Inés Macho-stadler, J. David Pérez-castrillo ; Translated By Richard Watt. A Translation, With Some Minor Revisions, Of The 1994 Edition Published By Ariel Economía. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.