Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control

although Much Human Action Serves As Proof That Irrational Behavior Is Remarkably Common, Certain Forms Of Irrationality—most Notably, Incontinent Action And Self-deception—pose Such Difficult Theoretical Problems That Philosophers Have Rejected Them As Logically Or Psychologically Impossible. Here, Mele Shows That, And how, Incontinent Action And Self-deception Are Indeed Possible. Drawing Upon Recent Experimental Work In The Psychology Of Action And Inference, He Advances Naturalized Explanations Of Akratic Action And Self-deception While Resolving The Paradoxes Around Which The Philosophical Literature Revolves. In Addition, He Defends An Account Of Self-control, Argues That Strict Akratic Action Is An Insurmountable Obstacle For Traditional Belief-desire Models Of Action-explanation, And Explains How A Considerably Modified Model Accommodates Action Of This Sort.